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An attempt is made to give a heuristic explanation of the distinguished role of measurement in the
quantum theory. We question the notion of “naive” reductionism by stressing the difference between
an isolated quantum and classical object. It is argued that the transition from the micro- to the
macroscopic description should be made along some parameters not characterized by the quantum
theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most serious problems of the quantum
theory can be, in short, formulated as follows: its for-
malism is extremely accurate, but it is difficult to find
solid conceptual foundations for what it actually de-
scribes. Perhaps the only useful attitude is to claim
that it provides information exclusively on measure-
ment outcomes. However, it turned out to be sur-
prisingly hard to give the term “measurement” a clear
meaning on physical grounds. A consequence is that
it is still unknown how to obtain the classical ontology
from this theory in the macroscopic limit.
In this paper we would like to address some aspects
of the relation between the quantum and classical do-
mains. Our approach is definitely a heuristic one (ba-
sically, the present work could have been written right
after the formulation of quantum mechanics in the
20’s, since we do not invoke any intricate mechanisms
described by the theory itself). We aim at charac-
terising, in a very general and qualitative manner, a
conceptual scheme which, on one hand, would be in
agreement with the crucial empirical facts known from
the two regimes, and on the other - that would recon-
cile the solid picture of the world known from the clas-
sical with the fuzziness that the quantum one seems
to predict for the macroscopic level. However, we do
not want to speculate on what “actually happens” in
the quantum world - we only ask how to include a
smooth deformation of classical intuition into our un-
derstanding of the world to make the quantum theory
less in conflict with the classical one.
In the following, we question very mildly the re-
ductionistic attitude inherited from the XIX-century
classical statistical mechanics. In other words, we cast
doubt on the validity of an argument often encoun-
tered in works related to the interpretational prob-
lems of the quantum theory: “after all, macroscopic
objects are built of microscopic ones”. We do it by con-
centrating on the well-known fact that the quantum
state describes inherently context-dependent entities,
contrary to the classical one. It is suggested by these
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considerations that a deeper description than offered
by the quantum theory would be more natural for the
treatment of quantum-to-classical transition, and that
it is much easier to interpret the theory as a one that
lacks the description of an important piece of physics
from the very beginning (i.e. as a phenomenology).
We point that no “complete” explanation of the con-
ceptual strangeness of the quantum theory is given
here. Specifically, what quantum measurement really
is remains unexplained. Rather, we find a place for
the known quantum features in a larger framework.
To make as close connection with the classical intu-
ition as possible, we make much use the notion of ob-
ject. At first, our construction may seem of restricted
generality: we know that relativistic quantum physics
strongly suggests to avoid using objects. However, our
conclusions are valid for the observables themselves.
II. QUANTUM PECULIARITIES
To set the stage, we give a brief survey of charac-
teristic quantum features that we are going to address
specifically.
State vector collapse. As is widely known, the fol-
lowing applies to the time evolution of an “isolated
quantum system”:
• between a preparation at t = 0 and a mea-
surement at t = τ its pure state, represented
by a normalised vector from the Hilbert space,
evolves according to
|ψ(τ)〉 = e−iHτ |ψ(0)〉, (1)
where H is the system’s Hamiltonian (we set
the units so that the reduced Planck’s constant
~ = 1);
• after a projective measurement (we do not con-
sider other cases in this work) of an observable
with a non-degenerate spectrum, the state col-
lapses to an eigenstate |i〉 of the measured ob-
servable O giving the corresponding eigenvalue
as a result, with probability dictated by the
Born rule: pi = |〈i|ψ〉|
2.
2The second law seems to be an intriguing mixture of
a physical process and a change of knowledge. It is
stochastic and instantaneous (at least on the level of a
postulate), yet it cannot be a probability distribution
as classical mixed states are, since it seems to create
the values of observables. What is even more strange,
the created properties can be only “partly” fixed, as
seen, for instance, in the position measurement in non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. The measurement
“checking” that a particle “is” in a space volume V
reduces the support of the quantum state
|ψ〉 =
∫
d3x ψ(x)|x〉 (2)
with the projector
∫
V
d3x|x〉〈x|, (3)
where |x〉 constitute a basis of position operator
eigenvectors. However, it is hard to speak about
the position of the particle within the volume V in
the reduced state. Last but not least - the collapse
is not a unitary transformation, what makes it
fundamentally different from the evolution in (1).
However, one would rather expect measurement to
be an ordinary physical process.
Macroscopic superpositions. A peculiar feature
of the quantum theory is a possibility of producing
superpositions on a macroscopic scale. This is done
through establishing quantum correlations between a
microscopic quantum system and a large set of such
entities. One typically visualizes this in the von Neu-
mann measurement scheme [1] and the Schroedinger’s
cat paradox [2] (see also [3] for a much more thor-
ough description of the so-called measurement prob-
lem). Let us briefly describe their common features.
Consider states |si〉 of a quantum system and states
|aj〉 of the macroscopic object (we accept the univer-
sality of the theory). For clarity, we assume that
there exists a “ready” state, |a0〉. Since we want
to describe the process of establishing correlations
quantum-mechanically, we suppose the existence of a
unitary operator U which does the following:
|si〉|a0〉
U
−→ |si〉|ai〉 (4)
for every i. From the linearity of U it immediately
follows that:(∑
i
αi|si〉
)
|a0〉
U
−→
∑
i
αi|si〉|ai〉. (5)
The above equation describes a large, macroscopic
system. However, since large-scale objects are never
observed in superpositions, this seems to be a pathol-
ogy. Put differently, it is not clear what a superposi-
tion should mean in the context of macroscopic bodies,
since their properties in such states are not definite.
In case of the von Neumann scheme, (5) leads to the
so-called problem of definite outcomes.
We stress that the above being possibly a descrip-
tion of measurement is of secondary importance to
us. What really counts is that quantum superposi-
tions can in principle be amplified to the macroscopic
level through establishing quantum correlations.
III. REDUCTIONISM AND
CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE
A matter of fundamental importance for our picture
of the world and the consistency of physical theories
is how to relate micro- and macroscopic domains. It is
á priori acceptable that the microworld has its own,
unintuitive laws, but nevertheless we would like to ob-
tain a proper classical limit from the quantum theory,
in particular concerning the ontology. Perhaps our
starting point in establishing such relations would be
to postulate that macroscopic objects we knew from
our surroundings were simply built of some micro-
scopic ones. Such approach turned out to be very
fruitful when classical statistical mechanics of gases
and liquids was being formulated. There, the funda-
mental constituents of matter followed the same laws
of motion as the macroscopic complex objects. Sim-
plifying the issue a bit, we may say that the only
significant difference between the small and the big
objects was the size. Now, after quantum mechan-
ics appeared on the scene, it was natural to consider
it simply as a refined description of these elementary
objects. However, quite soon the problems mentioned
in the previous section started to appear - quantum
systems of macroscopic size can be put into superpo-
sitions and properties of quantum objects are defined
by the measurement procedure, what can hardly be
called “classical”. In such situation, a way out was
to invent specific mechanisms that could produce at
least the “appearance” of the classical world (employ-
ing the theory of decoherence, for instance) or some-
how interpret the quantum theory keeping in mind
the reductionistic attitude (see [4] for an exposition of
the main approaches; this reference may be also used
for all other quantum-foundational issues mentioned
in this paper). Unfortunately, no general consensus
was reached along these lines of research.
At this point, a different - and perhaps a bit too
radical at first sight - route may be taken. A conclu-
sion that one might draw by examining the behaviour
of elementary constituents of matter is that, treated
naively, the idea of building might simply be false:
since the classical limit of the theory is so ill-defined,
maybe the limiting procedure is applied to a wrong
piece of our description of the world? In the author’s
opinion this is indeed so, and this is ultimately due
the difference between classical and quantum isola-
3tion. Consider a single, isolated quantum point par-
ticle. It is evident from what has been recalled in
the previous section that on the quantum level it no
longer makes sense to talk about it as separated out
of its environment (whatever this environment may
be), contrary to the classical case, and characterized
by properties like position, momentum, energy, an-
gular momentum etc. Note that the state of such
“meaningless” entity as our particle is described by a
vector from the Hilbert space. Now, let us add some
more (a lot more) quantum objects to the picture.
What we end up with is again a vector in some Hilbert
space. A question: why should this large compound
object (treated as an isolated one) make more sense
as a whole than a single isolated particle if we use the
same formalism to describe them? We clearly see from
this that an application of the quantum composition
of elementary objects by building a large Hilbert space
simply does not do the job of recovering the classical
world, because the properties of a quantum object -
no matter how large - are, in some sense, joint prop-
erties of this object and the “measuring apparatus”,
they are defined only in some context. This context
seems to be something external that quantum theory
does not allow to purely express in terms of elemen-
tary quantum objects. The whole picture still needs
to be supplemented by some important ingredient -
which is, of course, quietly introduced by the collapse
postulate.
The argument “every child knows that every macro-
scopic body is built of elementary quantum objects
and should be describable by the quantum formalism”
can be immediately responded to with “where do we
know that from?”. “Well, the theory, which always
gives perfect predictions, says so” is certainly not the
right answer, looking at the problems we encounter in
constructing the classical limit of the quantum theory.
Thus, a remark concerning reductionism - we should
not presuppose the validity of certain concepts, but
rather infer it from the working piece of knowledge.
In fact, what is implied by quantum physics is that
we can find some smaller objects inside bigger ones
(we see them when we look for them) - and nothing
more.
Of course, reductionism in terms of quantum ob-
jects is essential for explaining many properties macro-
scopic bodies. In this sense, reductionism has per-
haps never failed. It is thus obvious that it should
be treated as one of the pillars of modern physics.
But how can we then reconcile these two seemingly
contradictory points? To remain consistent, we de-
duce that only a deviation from reductionism which is
small (i.e. unimportant from the operational point of
view) is present in the quantum theory, and that only
this part is responsible for conceptual problems we en-
counter in the case of quantum-to-classical transition.
This is what makes us slightly modify the canonical
view and instead of saying “macroscopic objects have
some collective features because they are sets of ele-
mentary quantum entities” say “macroscopic objects
have some «collective» features because elementary
quantum entities (or sets of them) can be somehow
produced inside them by what we call measurement
and what we do not understand”. We stress that these
two should be clearly distinguished because the reduc-
tionism itself does not explain the classical ontology -
a separate measurement postulate apparently has to
be included [5].
A natural question arises: what can we propose in-
stead of the naive reductionistic approach that would
include the mentioned deviation in a desired way? Let
us for a moment shift our attention from objects to ob-
servables (we will be able to make conclusions on the
former if we treat them simply as sets of properties).
The idea now is to take the quantum-mechanical de-
scription of measurement seriously and assume that
properties of quantum systems are indeed created -
and to a different “degree”, in accordance with the
discussion around (3) - during this process, whatever
it is. We do not propose any underlying mechanisms
allowing to reconstruct these quantities, but try to
speculate what general changes we could introduce to
our picture of the world by considering such possibil-
ity.
To summarize what we have already said: whatever
quantum theory describes, it does it very well. Our
job now is to make the best conceptual fit for the for-
malism. Even if it explicitly points that the formalism
is not fundamental.
IV. OBSERVABLES AS EMERGENT
QUANTITIES
Let us then stop treating known physical quantities
(both familiar from the classical level, like position
and momentum, and specifically quantum-mechanical
ones, like spin) as fundamental. In other words, we
propose that the range of validity of these quantities
is in general not infinite [6]. In this context, let us
introduce an entity (call it E), from which they are
emergent. Strictly speaking, we treat this structure
for the moment as the world, and all of our physics as
describing some emergent properties of it (in section
VI we point that it does not do much harm if we forget
it, but it is much more convenient to keep it along the
argumentation we present). Actually, we would like to
say as little as possible about E , not to hypothesize too
much and to try to give a better conceptual foundation
of the quantum theory without formally extending it.
We only assume that the behaviour of this entity can
produce at least two kinds of conditions:
• ones in which this emergence is clearly dynami-
cal (we then refer to the dynamical level of E),
• and ones in which the mentioned physical quan-
4tities are “stable” (then we talk about the stable
level ; our experience tells us that this happens
for instance on the classical level which lives its
own life and is insensitive to fluctuations “be-
low”; let us assume, however, that the “dynam-
ical” conditions may also appear on the macro-
scopic level - when we superpose a large collec-
tion of quantum objects).
In other words, we locate the micro- and macrolevel
known from the experience somewhere in E . We point
that a given physical quantity, like position, refers to
rather different entities in the two cases - on the mi-
crolevel it might be an elementary particle, on the
macrolevel - a point (or rather what we see as a point)
of a macroscopic object. The former is a “partly deter-
mined” physical quantity, as discussed in the vicinity
of (3). A position of some tiny region of a macroscopic
body is thus not treated as really a position of some
set of elementary constituents. We make this distinc-
tion clearly since the big objects are no longer treated
as built so directly from the small ones.
Naturally, the scale is defined in this scheme by the
characteristics of E (we may think of some “ghost pa-
rameters” that move us between the two levels de-
scribed above). A consequence is that what serves as
the definition of the scale in a naively reductionistic
approach (concentration of objects, their size etc.) is
now somehow only a product. That is, the existence
of the stable level is established not by employing the
quantum law of composition of some elementary ob-
jects, but by some completely unknown quantities. Of
course, one still can find more atoms in a cubic meter
of a given substance than in a cubic nanometer of it,
but the quantum-to-classical transition is governed by
unknown to us characteristics of E .
It is worth stressing that since the familiar physi-
cal quantities usually do not exist on the dynamical
level, almost everything we say about these quantities
is related to the stable (and thus usually classical) one.
First, this justifies treating the macroscopically visible
parts of measurement apparatuses as purely classical
in our approach (á la orthodox interpretation). Sec-
ond, it “explains” why we often need a classical theory
to quantize, not the other way round - quantum the-
ory serves in this approach to tell us in part about
quantities which are emergent and present usually on
the classical level.
Observe that in such scenario, measurement may
be looked upon as a dynamical process, describable
only in terms of the dynamics of E , and leading to a
dynamical creation of the value an observable. Why
should we be fond of that? There are at least a few
good reasons:
• as mentioned, the values of observables really
seem to be created, not discovered in this pro-
cess;
• the uncertainty principle becomes more compre-
hensible - the “measured” quantities are now in-
deed defined by the measuring procedure which
depends on the details of the behaviour of E ;
thus, if it is impossible to measure simultane-
ously two quantities, they cannot exist simul-
taneously and this would explain why so-called
quantum particles do not have trajectories (by
the way, this shows why observables are a bit
more fundamental than objects, since we can
have momentum without having position);
• contextuality (in the sense of Kochen and
Specker) also seems more “acceptable”, since
two different measurement procedures, having
a common observable as their “target”, may be
related to essentially different dynamics of E ;
• quantum Zeno effect also finds its “justification”
- a state gets “frozen” and the quantum sys-
tem cannot evolve when repeatedly measured
because such continuous process can be viewed
as sustaining the same dynamical state of E , in
which the values of observables have been pro-
duced, for some period of time.
Of course, the sole act of measuring is not the only
phenomenon that is capable of creating the values of
observables - the classical world should arise and oper-
ate even if there is not anyone to make measurements.
We postulate that the dynamics of E leading to this
creation simply occurs in what we usually take as mea-
surement situations.
Let us now come back to the notion of object. How
does the above scenario relate to the observation that
objects we see in experiments have their properties de-
fined only in some context? The context-dependence
means that it makes sense only to describe some larger
set such objects, already equipped with properties,
are a part of. As entities characterized by some [7]
familiar physical properties, they simply do not exist
beyond these sets. This in turn means that they are
inconceivable alone. Thus, these objects have to arise
together with their properties. Actually, we should re-
formulate a bit our observation that quantum objects
are context-dependent. That is, if we understand such
objects merely as collections of their properties, then,
strictly speaking, such objects do not exist beyond the
stable level.
In summary, quantum objects do not have a char-
acter of some elementary entities or building blocks,
but rather of a behaviour of some underlying “mate-
rial”. That is the reason why we introduced E . All
this means that modern physics is about:
• emergent structures containing what we know as
objects characterized by familiar physical quan-
tities - this is the more or less well-defined clas-
sical region,
• the emergence of these structures without know-
ing how it happens - this is the quantum part.
5It also means that what we customarily call a quan-
tum isolated object is a fundamentally different con-
cept than a classical isolated one. Classically (and
thus macroscopically in practice), something is iso-
lated if the influence of the surrounding objects on it is
negligible. On the quantum level, however, the isola-
tion means also depriving the object of its properties.
If we do not allow for any other physical properties
of such object, then “quantum isolation” means only
an isolation of a particular Hilbert space form other
Hilbert spaces, without reference to “physical objects”.
V. QUANTUM STATE
It would now be in order to say how we under-
stand the quantum state in the light of what has been
said above. First of all, recall that the variables on
which state depends are, on the physical side, emer-
gent. This means that we need both a “source” and
a “detector” to obtain meaningful numbers from the
theory (in this case - probabilities), because only these
two apparatuses taken together seem to let us stay on
the level where the studied physical quantities are de-
termined. The quantum state can then be safely re-
garded as only a means of relating different probabil-
ity distributions, not as something describing “a par-
ticle” or whatever (usability of a single Hilbert space
should not necessarily be interpreted as implying the
existence of a single physical object; this implication
ought to be true only relative to the stable level -
where stochastic acts of creation of properties may
be combined into a mental picture of a particle). It
is only a mapping defined on position, momentum or
directional (as for spin) space, not something corre-
sponding to intuitively understood possibilities. That
is, an expression like
|ψ〉 = α|x〉 + β|y〉 (6)
should be taken as “we have a mapping defined on two
points in space”, not as “there is a particle smeared
over the region consisting of two points”. Conceptual
problems seem to start appearing if we make the fol-
lowing association:
|x〉 ↔ x. (7)
This, however, should never be done, since the for-
mer (which is quantum) means that there is a chance
that some physical position described by co-ordinates
x will be created, whereas the latter (which is classi-
cal) describes a physically existing position at x. It is
important to note that this is always true, even in the
case when a system is in an eigenstate.
Actually, in the context of previous sections it would
be more appropriate to consider exclusively the prob-
ability distributions and forget about attributing any
meaning to the state. We would then have only a sin-
gle law of time evolution - concerning solely the prob-
abilities. This, however, would be a bit inconvenient,
since the state allows us to include the conditioning
of these distributions on what happens on the stable
level in a very natural way (this conditioning is done,
of course, through the infamous collapse; the question
if it is really instantaneous does not seem to be easy
to answer, but at least we see that the issue should
be ambiguous - after all, we now nothing about the
dynamics of E).
We would now like to comment on a very impor-
tant issue concerning the quantum-to-classical tran-
sition, i.e. the implications of what goes under the
name “theory of decoherence”. It is interesting to see
how one can relate the classical-like features it pro-
duces (including decoherence proper and selection of
pointer states by environment; see [3] for a discussion
and a list of important references) with our approach.
For that purpose, imagine that E produces two clas-
sical structures σ1 and σ2 (on the stable level) that
are isolated from one another. That is, within them
the quantities like position and momentum exist, but
they do not relate the structures themselves. We can
model the scenario known from the Schroedinger’s cat
paradox with these - σ1 may correspond to the inte-
rior of the box, σ2 to the exterior containing the ob-
server. Now, assume that, as a result of the dynam-
ics of E , σ1 and σ2 merge. From the point of view,
say, σ2, the structure σ1 gets created in it (and vice
versa). This means that many observables, pertain-
ing to many objects, get their values fixed in σ2 at
the same time. Since we expect classical-like correla-
tions between them, the quantum formalism should be
able to mirror these. Besides that, it is interesting to
note that the “border” between these structures, ob-
viously going through E , would naturally correspond
to the so-called Heisenberg cut.
VI. EMERGENT FROM WHAT?
The reason why we introduced E was to make “more
room”, so as to - in our opinion - more naturally re-
distribute certain conceptual elements of the quan-
tum theory, to embed its conceptual structure in a
wider one, so as to make it more comprehensible. Ob-
viously - we now nothing more about E , at least at
the moment. We think that discovering E essentially
amounts to discovering new physics, explaining, for
instance, the dynamical formation of quantities like
position, momentum etc.
However, one may look at the situation from a bit
different angle. We may simply say that the precise
knowledge of E is unimportant here - we only want
the relations between different parts of the quantum
formalism to be established. We are convinced that
this whole presentation makes it plausible that the
6quantum theory is indeed a description of a world in
which the precise shape of E has been forgotten. In
particular, it goes together with two trademarks of
the quantum theory: a lack of ontology (which is ob-
viously realised by E now) and a distinguished role of
the observer (who has to check by his own eyes what
happens in the laboratory since he does not know the
precise dynamics of E). A very important note is that
this may be applied even if it is for some reason im-
possible for us to discover a better characterization of
E . Of course, it is now the primary goal to look for
such structure as E , but this is not needed to give a
qualitative interpretation of the quantum theory itself.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that perhaps the most serious con-
ceptual problem of the quantum theory - related to
the prediction of macroscopic superpositions - results
from sticking to a straightforwardly understood no-
tion of reductionism. By using the intuitive notions
of object, context-dependence and emergence we have
shown that quantum theory looks as if there existed
an unknown entity which literally produces the quan-
tities we call “observables” in the process we custom-
arily call “quantum measurement”. We argued essen-
tially that the physical principle behind the funda-
mental conceptual difference between quantum and
classical mechanics is, metaphorically speaking, the
following: when we describe physical object, we can-
not do that without describing other physical objects.
To be more precise - one cannot describe a particle
with its position without mentioning other things that
also have a position (measurement apparatus, for in-
stance). In other words, in the quantum case one can-
not introduce a kind of a background on which the
objects are living (phase space, for instance). How-
ever, the process of including more and more entities
should not be conducted on the level of the quantum
formalism.
Obviously, we have not said anything about a for-
mal derivation of the theory based on the introduced
conceptual scheme. This issue is going to be addressed
in forthcoming papers.
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